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TROVER AND CONVERSIoN-DAMAGES--WRONGFUL SALE OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS
AND HEIRO0MS BY WAREHOUSEMAN.-The plaintiff sued the storage company
for the conversion of certain household goods stored with the defendant. The
property, namely certain furniture, clothing, and keepsakes, was sold for unpaid
storage fees. The warehouseman did not give the plaintiff proper notice of the
sale. The referee, to whom the case was referred for the computation of dam-
ages, awarded the plaintiff an amount based upon the values set forth in the
testimony of an expert withness upon the secondhand market value of the
property. Judgment was entered for that sum. On appeal, held, judgment re-
versed and modified; the proper criterion of damages is the actual value
of the property to the owner, exclusive of any sentimental or fanciful notions
of worth. Harvey v. Wheeler Storage and Transfer Co., (Wis. 1938) 277 N.W.
627.
In an action for the conversion of personal property, the market value of the
property at the time and the place of the conversion is ordinarily the basis for
the determination of damages. A distinction, however, is raised between ordi-
nary personal property and personal property specially adapted to individual use
such as clothing, household furniture, heirlooms, and keepsakes. In an action
against a warehouseman for the conversion of certain wearing apparel and
household goods, it was held that goods kept for personal use cannot in any
fair sense be said to have a market value or at least a market value indicative
of the true value of the property to the owner, and that a basis for recovery
should be the actual money loss to the owner and not merely the re-sale price
on the open market. Lake v. Dye, 232 N.Y. 209, 133 N.E. 448 (1921). Similarly
in a suit for the loss of household effects, it was held that the secondhand price
of personal property is so depreciated compared to the actual or extrinsic value
to the owner that it is not a just compensation for the actual loss and is there-
fore not be used as the basis for the determination of the damages. Pecos & N.
T. Ry. v. Grundy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 171 S.W. 318. In a case like the
instant case, where a warehouseman sold property without due notice to its
owner, it was held that the amount to be recovered should not be restricted to
the price which could be realized at a sale in the open market, but that the
owner should be permitted to recover the true value of the property based upon
actual money loss and upon other circumstances peculiar to the individual case.
Weinstein v. Santini Transfer Co., 155 Misc. 139, 278 N.Y. Supp. 388 (1935);
Taggart v. Graby, 159 Misc. 155, 286 N.Y. Supp. 382 (1936). Thus, in the deter-
mination of the value of converted property, the market price is not entirely
excluded from consideration, but is rather made one of several factors that
together make up the value of the property to the individual owner. Other
determinates were enumerated in a suit for the loss of household effects by
fire, it being held that where the property has a peculiar value to its owner the
just rule of damages is the actual value of the property destroyed, taking into
consideration the original cost of the article, the depreciation, the practicability
of replacing it, and such other considerations as in the particular case affect
its value to the owner. Lloyd v. Haugh Storage & Transfer, 223 Pa. 148, 72
At. 516 (1909). Similarly in an action for the conversion of a Persian rug and
other personal property, the court permitted, in the determination of damages,
introduction of evidence of the cost of the article when new, the amount of
depreciation since the purchase, the length of time which the property has been
used, the condition of the property at the time of its conversion, and the expense
of replacing the goods. Jelalian v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 134 App.
Div. 381, 119 N.Y. Supp. 136 (1909); Cf. Stanley v. Smith, 135 Ark. 502, 205
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S.W. 889 (1918). In another case "actual loss" was defined as the loss which
the owner would sustain, in terms of money, by being deprived of the articles
so specifically adapted to the use of himself and his family. St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co. v. Dunham, 36 Okla. 724, 129 Pac. 862 (1913). In an action for the conversion
of a slightly used overcoat its purchase price was held to be prima facie evidence
of its value. Gold v. Rousso, 238 Ill. App. 427 (1925). However in a similar case,
it was held that the cost price of napkins when new was insufficient to form the
basis for the computation of damages for their conversion seven months after
their purchase during which time they had been used. Independence Linen Sup-
ply and Steam Laundry v. Zakrowsky, 158 N.Y. Supp. 721 (1916). The use of
the original cost price was further limited in International & G. N. R. Co. v.
Bartek, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 175 S.W. 1106, where it was held that the dam-
ages for conversion of personal property cannot be based solely on their original
cost because such damages would be excessive. The use of market value of
personal property in the determination of damages is also limited, as it was
held in the instant case that the term "market" in order to be used must imply
not only that one party may readily sell the goods in question at a given price,
but also that there is some one who, desiring just such a particular article,
may readily buy it a the given price. Thus in an action for the conversion of a
sofa, a witness was permitted to testify as an expert that the sofa would be
worth $50 to one who liked antique furniture, but if sold on the secondhand
furniture market or at an auction it would be worth probably only $20.
Bradley v. Hooker, 175 Mass. 142, 55 N.E. 848 (1900). Similarly the showing
of an appreciable demand for the particular type of property plus a fair market
value does not exclude the consideration of the other factors in the determina-
tion of loss. In a suit by the lessee of a hotel for the conversion of furniture
seized by the lessor for non-payment of rent, it was held that the failure to
plead the absence of a market value did not prevent the plaintiff from raising
the issue of the actual value to the owner. Wutke v. Yolton, (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) 71 S.W. (2d) 549; Wald Transfer and Storage v. Giese, (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) 101 S.W. (2d) 603. The exclusion of sentimental and fanciful values
placed on property as a factor in the determination of actual value is practically
universal. However certain of the cases involving the conversion of heirlooms
and keepsakes show a tendency to enhance the actual value by a consideration
of the special nature of the property as an heirloom or keepsake.-In Bateman v.
Ryder, 106 Tenn. 712, 64 S.W. 48 (1909), it was held that although ordinarily
there can be no recovery for the sentimental value of personal property, the
rule that damages must be adequate would seem to indicate that in cases in-
volving the conversion of family pictures and other heirlooms a special value
should be allowed. The use of the term "special value" does not however infer
that sentimental associations may be used as a factor in the determination of
the damages, for in an action for the conversion of a portrait, though the court
permitted an enhanced valuation, it epecifically refused to permit testimony as
to the value of the portrait based upon the associations connected with it on the
grounds that this would be an attempt to assess sentimental damages. Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Stewart, 78 Miss. 600, 26 So. 394 (1901). In a case regarded
by many as the leading case on damages for the conversion of heirlooms, if
was held that the rule of damages is to be the actual value, taking into account
the original cost of the portrait and the expense and practicability of replacing
it, together with such other considerations as in the particular case affect its
value to the owner. Green v. Boston & L. R. Co., 128 Mass. 221 (1880). Thus
it would seem that the same factors govern the estimation of damages for the
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conversion of heirlooms and keepsakes as govern the estimation of damages
for the conversion of household goods and clothing. This may also be inferred
from the holding of a later case where in a suit for the conversion of a hand
carved gold leafed picture frame formerly belonging to the plaintiff's mother, and
an heirloom in the plaintiff's family from the eighteenth century while the
family was yet a member of the nobility, it was held that the special value of
the frame as an heirloom was to be the measure of the damages even though it
exceeded the market value of the frame. Kalinowski v. Newhouse & Sons, (Mo.
App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 1094.
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